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Introduction
On 1 March 2005, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces launched an 
offensive in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to 
suppress a rebellion.^ At 08:00, commanders deployed twelve armoured per­
sonnel carriers. Ground forces cordoned off the area and asked for air support. 
At 11:00, the target was located and engaged. Mi-25 attack helicopters 
swooped in, firing sixteen rockets in eight passes. The militia camp was 
successfully ‘neutrahzed’ and UN troops were withdrawn from the area by 
16:00. An estimated fifty rebels were killed. Tt may look like war’, explained 
Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye, Force Commander of the mission, ‘but it is 
peacekeeping.’^ ‘We were impartial.’^
The assault, part of the UN’s Operation Djugu III, was no aberration. Since 
1999, blue helmets in places such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, Ivory Coast, and 
Mali have conducted military offensives to ‘keep’ and ‘make’ peace. Once 
limited in scope and based firmly on the consent of all parties, peacekeeping 
operations are now regularly authorized under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, charged with penalizing spoilers of the peace and protecting 
civilians from peril. Anything less amounts to what the Report of the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) condemned as ‘complicity 
with evil’.^ Peacekeepers are now expected to search for, and then side with, 
the victims.
Despite this more aggressive posture, UN officials such as Lt. Gen. Gaye as 
well as academics continue to affirm the vital importance of impartiahty—a 
norm traditionally regarded as the ‘oxygen’^ and ‘lifeblood’® of peacekeeping— 
while stating that it no longer means what it once did. They characterize 
the new impartiality as ‘active’ impartiality,^ ‘unrestrained’ impartiality,® 
even ‘imperial’ impartiality®—implying that peacekeepers are, or should be, 
robust and assertive in carrying out their increasingly lofty and ambitious 
mandates.
2IMPARTIAL PEACEKEEPING AND ASSERTIVE 
LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM
Taking Sides in Peacekeeping
This book is the first scholarly attempt to analyse this transformation and its 
implications. It argues that the change in the understanding and practices of 
impartiality is significant. Because impartiality refers not only to the position 
of peacekeepers as an unbiased and informed third party but also to the values 
and norms the UN itself seeks to project, this change, which is manifest in 
discourse and institutionalized in doctrine and rules of engagement (RoE), 
signifies a radical transformation in the very nature and substance of 
peacekeeping, and in the UN’s role as guarantor of international peace 
and security. Claims to impartial authority are no longer based exclusively 
on terms to which all parties consent. Instead, they are premised on a more 
ambitious and expansive set of human-rights-related norms, around which 
consensus is presumed but not always secured. While traditional peace­
keeping mandates treated parties with moral equivalence and eschewed 
notions of blame and punishment, instigators of violence are often now 
seen as criminals—their crime a form of moral collapse to be judged and 
righted by peacekeepers, rather than as a symptom of a political conflict to 
be mediated.
What is more, this change is not limited to peacekeeping. It is an integral 
part of the turn towards what I refer to as a more assertive liberal internation­
alism, one that is transforming existing international institutions and prac­
tices, particularly the UN. The realization, promotion, and protection of 
human rights is at the core of this broader shift and has translated into 
forms of international engagement that are less consensual and more com­
pulsory and coercive, justified by upholding human rights and constellating a 
new class of international crimes.^®
Here, too, claims to impartial authority figure prominently, but they have 
taken on new meaning. For example, through the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is imprecedented in its 
claim to impartially investigate and try alleged perpetrators of international 
crimes independently of whether their states have given consent to the organ­
ization by ratifying the Rome Statute. “ In the field of humanitarian assistance, 
many of today’s aid workers no longer impartially provide emergency relief to 
individuals based exclusively on need. Decisions about who should receive 
assistance are now often influenced by whether they help or hinder the 
realization of rights. While claiming to be impartial, humanitarian actors 
frequently advocate for human-rights protections and actively seek to reform 
pohtical and social structures that impinge on those rights. Similarly, the UN’s 
Human Rights Up Front policy, developed in 2013, puts the imperative to 
protect people from serious violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law at the core of the organization’s strategy and operational
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activities, and obliges staff to speak out on an ‘impartial basis about abuses 
and looming crises.
The legitimacy of this more assertive liberal internationalism, and associ­
ated claims by peacekeepers, judges, and aid workers that their more coercive 
and intrusive actions are impartial, rests largely on what is extolled as a 
newfound unity of purpose. What is the base for such a claim? Academics 
and practitioners alike contend that the ‘internationalization of human rights’ 
over several decades has allowed for an acceptable transformation in the 
foundation of certain norms that now have authority not because they are 
based on the consent of individual states, but rather because they are seen to 
reflect a collective international consensus—what scholar Ruti Teitel describes 
as the ‘new law of humanity’.*^ At the core of this transformation is the idea 
that human rights and the protection of those rights, particularly for those 
most vulnerable in armed conflict, are no longer tied to a particular political or 
partisan agenda. ‘Protecting civihans transcends politics, as one diplomat 
recently proclaimed in the Security Council.'"*
This notion has become a powerful piety, described by some as the ‘new 
ideology’, even a ‘secular religion’.'^ The unassaUably worthy conviction that 
human rights and peacekeeping in the service of those rights are above 
politics, and that above all, individual civilians should be protected, is potent. 
It allows for simple and easily comprehensible accounts of right and wrong, in 
what are often contexts of extreme human suffering. It differentiates victim 
from perpetrator, assigns innocence and guilt, and it furnishes apparently 
straightforward answers to questions about what must be done to bring about 
good, to stop the suffering. In other words, it provides something to believe in. 
All of which makes it very difficult indeed to argue with. Contestation, fi-om 
this perspective, would appear to be a thing of the past.
This book examines this shift towards assertive liberal internationalism in 
the context of UN peacekeeping. This focus is important because, despite the 
significance of this change and the long lineage of impartiality in peacekeep­
ing, the norm has been the subject of surprisingly little sustained analysis.' 
Whereas consent of the host state and non-use of force—the two other norms 
traditionally associated with peacekeeping—have been the focus of several 
comprehensive academic studies,'^ unpartiality has received little more than 
passing references to its vital unportance'* and its application in specific 
historical cases.'^ Given that the dominant meaning of impartiality has rad­
ically changed, this omission is a glaring oversight, not least because of its 
implications/or the other two norms.
Rather, in an apparent case of ‘taking sides’, scholars of peacekeeping have 
done more actively to advocate for the new more assertive conception of 
impartiality and applaud its institutionalization in the new millennium than 
they have critically to interrogate the norm and its implications from political 
and operational perspectives.^" In their reflections on the peacekeeping
4failures of the 1990s, many academics excoriated the UN and its ‘institutional 
ideology of impartiality’ as entirely inappropriate for the post-Cold War 
operational environment of catastrophic mass violence?^ They contended 
that ‘impartiality had to be reconceived’, called for clarification in both the 
conceptual and operational domains, and advanced their own interpretations 
of the norm.^^ Others imposed a distinction where none had previously 
existed; they redefined Cold War peacekeeping, ex post facto, as ‘neutral’ to 
denote its passive character whereas it was hoped that post-Cold War activity 
would, in a more dynamic sense, be ‘impartial’.^^ These texts do not engage in 
rigorous conceptud analysis or with what one author describes as the ‘broader 
political-strategic issues surrounding new impartiality’.^^ Lacking this wider 
view, our understanding of the politics and practices of contemporary peace­
keeping, as well as the normative framework that underpins and is used to 
justify the authority of peacekeepers and the UN, is incomplete and partial.
Meanwhile, peacekeeping has descended into a state of renewed crisis. In 
many mission contexts, which have experienced repeated crises in recent 
years, peace and stability have become a mirage. In places like Darfur, South 
Sudan, Burundi, and Congo where the UN’s political space has been restricted, 
mandate implementation has been thwarted by intransigent host govern­
ments, freedom of movement has been curtailed, officials have been made 
persona non grata and missions have, at various junctures, been threatened 
with expulsion. What is more, an increase in attacks on and kidnappings of 
UN personnel has prompted troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to with­
draw contingents from missions that are already notoriously under-resourced 
and plagued by technical difficulties.
Taking Sides in Peacekeeping
THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING
It is in this context that a closer and more critical examination of the dominant 
conception of impartiality as a norm of UN peacekeeping becomes essential. 
This book starts from the premise that claims to impartiahty must be con­
sidered as only that—claims. Rather than accept that consensus exists over the 
meaning and appropriateness of the new more assertive conception of impar­
tiality, and that the decisions and actions of peacekeepers are impartial, I take 
these as assertions that require empirical investigation. History is rife with 
instances of closeted sectarianism and abuses of authority under the guise of 
impartiality. Without social validation there is a danger that impartialism 
becomes, as John Rawls cautioned, ‘just another sectarian doctrine’, except 
that, whereas others are up front about their sectarianism, impartiahsts con­
ceal their predilections.^^ Indeed, it is precisely because, as Thomas Franck put
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it, impartiality’s ‘yoke is so eminently wearable’, that a closer look at the norm 
in contemporary peacekeeping is vital.^®
Two central and closely connected questions provide the overarching focus 
for this inquiry. First, how is impartiality understood as a norm of UN 
peacekeeping and, second, what are the effects of this understanding? To 
answer these questions, I conceptualize impartiality as a ‘composite’ norm, 
one that is not free-standing but is in fact an aggregate of other principles— 
each of which can change and is open to contestation, singly or in combin­
ation. Drawing on political and legal theory, I elucidate the core components 
of impartiality and provide much needed conceptual clarity.
The composite norm is then used to conduct a multi-level analysis. I trace 
the evolution of impartiality in peacekeeping and examine the macro-level 
politics surrounding institutionalization of the new, more assertive conception 
of the norm at the UN, as well as the micro-level politics surrounding its 
implementation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, site of the largest 
and costliest peacekeeping mission in UN history (1999-2015).^^ I identify the 
various sites and sources of contestation over assertive impartiaUty at both 
levels and explicate their linkages. Multi-level analysis is crucial because 
impartiality is a peripatetic norm, relevant from the hallowed halls of UN 
headquarters in New York to the remote villages where blue helmets deploy. 
To understand how, amidst contestation, certain conceptions of impartiality 
have become dominant both in policy and practice, I analyse different insti­
tutional decision-making pathways and their power dynamics. In doing so, 
this book illuminates how certain actors wield greater influence than others in 
determining the policies and practices of UN peacekeeping, and the meaning 
of impartiahty itself.
The Congo case is particularly salient in examining the effects of imparti­
ality on peacekeeping practice as well as broader institutional dynamics. The 
Mission de VOrganisation des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du 
Congo (known by its French acronym, MONUC) was first deployed in late 
1999, three years before the formal end of Congo’s epic war and just as the new 
conception of impartiality began to take hold at the UN. It was a testament to 
the prevailing thinking in the Security Council. During dehberations on the 
creation of the mission, lessons learned from previous peacekeeping failures 
were recounted, and the need for robust peacekeeping affirmed by various 
member states.^* Indeed, MONUC became the standard-bearer for a new era 
of blue-helmet intervention and represented, as South African ambassador 
Dumisani Kumalo opined, a ‘litmus test’ for the Council’s commitment to 
peacekeeping in Africa.^^
MONUC’s decade-long deployment saw the institutionalization of the 
more assertive conception of impartiality manifest in Council resolutions 
that steadily increased the reputed robustness of the mission. Its Chapter VII 
mandate expanded to encompass the entire country, naming and shaming of
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was designated MONUC’s highest priority. In 2010, the mission was renamed 
the Mission de VOrganisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en 
Republique Democratique du Congo (MONUSCO), a signal that the UN was 
willing to use force more proactively, and in 2013, the Council deployed the 
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a specialized unit within MONUSCO, 
authorized to take offensive military action to ‘neutralize’ and ‘disarm’ rebel 
groups.^*^ Throughout this period, Congo became a laboratory for more 
assertive approaches to peacekeeping, and operational mechanisms and guid­
ance developed by MONUC/MONUSCO in turn fed back into policymaking 
at UN headquarters, leading to more general innovations in doctrine.^* In 
addition, Congo became a focus country for the ICC and, more broadly, the 
locus of numerous humanitarian reform initiatives associated with assertive 
liberal internationalism.
And yet, the analysis of impartiality at both macro- and micro-level in 
Congo reveals that despite a veneer of consensus, ‘impartiality’ is in fact a 
highly contested norm. As the collection of principles it refers to has changed 
and expanded to encompass human rights, contestation has increased, with 
deep disagreement among key UN member states and local actors in Congo as 
to what keeping peace impartially means and, consequently, over the purposes 
of contemporary peacekeeping and the UN’s broader approach to conflict 
resolution. This is not to say that human rights in peacekeeping are irrelevant. 
Few would disagree that they matter deeply, arguably more so now than ever 
before. But, as this book demonstrates, human rights cannot be divorced from 
power and partisan interests, past injustices, and present inequalities. Nor can 
they be considered separately from the privileges still accorded to states in 
international relations and particularly those at the UN, given its state-centric 
constitution.
The contestation over assertive impartiality reveals this plurality of con­
tending perspectives at multiple levels. The objections raised during institu­
tionalization within the UN are varied and diverse as Chapter 3 demonstrates. 
They reflect fears, frequently emanating from the experiences of some states as 
colonial subjects, that more coercive forms of peacekeeping chip away at 
sovereignty and self-determination and may be used to realize more nefarious 
intentions. They come in the form of charges of hypocrisy, and criticisms of 
unequal burden-sharing in peacekeeping. They reveal concerns about the 
viabihty of and the moral hazards engendered by contemporary practices— 
hard lessons learned from time on the ground. And they have very real 
implications for the willingness of traditional troop-contributing countries 
to sustain these operations as well as for the UN’s acceptance on the ground.
These forms of contestation have also been manifest during implementa­
tion, a process that, as I show in Chapter 4, generates its own forms of 
disagreement related to the historical, social, and political dynamics in
Taking Sides in Peacekeeping
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Congo. Among the many sites and sources of contestation, from tensions 
between troop-contributing countries to bitter divisions within the Security 
Council over policy towards the Congo and the wider region, I show how the 
dichotomies attendant in assertive impartiality often break down in practice. 
In Congo, there were often no clear answers to the questions of who is 
perpetrator and who victim, who protector and who in need of protection. 
And thus, attempts to pass judgment and take action by assigning such roles 
have, at numerous junctures, divided those involved, from the warring parties 
themselves to the peacekeeping mission, and more broadly, the international 
community.
Beyond the semantics, this disagreement has led to inconsistencies in 
peacekeeping practice, which further amplify perceptions of partiality and, 
together with the varying expectations and incentives created by the norm, 
have frequently resulted in perverse and unintended consequences that run 
contrary to the norm’s original intent and undermine the UN’s legitimacy. In 
Congo, civilians who were told that UN forces would protect them were at 
times emboldened to take even greater risks. Instead of fleeing to possible 
safety, they remained in place, or travelled in insecure conditions to UN bases. 
When protection was forthcoming, such risks were worthwhile. When it was 
not, the consequences were sometimes fatal. Similarly, armed groups and 
factions of the national army manipulated the mission and its mandate in 
order to realize strategic and political aims. The discourse of civihan protec­
tion was, for example, co-opted and instrumentalized by certain militia in an 
effort to change perceptions of their own legitimacy and to de-legitimate other 
actors, including the mission itself. This had negative consequences for peace­
keepers and the UN, and crucially impeded their ability to act and be accepted 
as a political arbiter, as a broker of peace.
As a whole, the book shows how the transformation in impartiality has 
deeply politicized peacekeeping and, in some cases such as Congo, effectively 
converted UN forces into one warring party among many. I argue that the 
implications of this change are significant, not only for peacekeeping but for 
the UN more broadly. As several scholars have demonstrated, the legitimacy 
of the organization—and by extension the likelihood of its securing the 
resources and access so critical to its operations—derives not just from its 
practical effectiveness, but from whether it is seen to reflect and promote 
shared values.This is of consequence, given that the institutional and 
broader geopolitical landscape have profoundly shifted. The rise of non- 
Westem states and changes in the global balance of power mean that 
contestation around underlying values, as described in this book, is likely 
to persist and even to grow. As the Conclusion argues, this raises pressing 
questions about the UN’s future role and its ability to act as the legitimate 
guarantor of international peace and security if it is perceived as partial, as 
having taken sides.
8THEORETICAL APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Taking Sides in Peacekeeping
This book is designed to speak to scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping 
and the UN, to others interested in Congo and, more broadly, to those 
concerned with the challenges associated with assertive liberal international­
ism. Yet it is not solely a work of policy analysis and prescription. It contrib­
utes to debates within the inter-disciplinary field of peacekeeping studies, 
which has undergone remarkable growth over the last decade.^^ The literature 
on peacekeeping has long been criticized for being apolitical and overly 
focused on the macro-level, skirting the importance of context and treating 
peacekeeping operations as technical policy tools. This trend, however, is 
being reversed by a body of work that does explore the political dimensions 
of peacekeeping operations.^"* Overlapping this research is a growing field of 
scholarship that has ‘gone micro’.^^ Drawing on the burgeoning political 
science literature on the micro-foundations of conflict, as well as insights 
from anthropology and sociology, this diverse research agenda has drawn 
much needed attention to the local dimensions of peacekeeping and peace­
building, including, the everyday practices of interveners, their interactions 
with local actors, and the consequences, intended and otherwise, of inter­
national engagement. These investigations affirm the importance of context, 
the contingency of peacekeeping practices, and offer a valuable counterpoint to 
macro-level analyses that have dominated the field and approached peacekeep­
ing as a predominantly international phenomenon.
My analysis of impartiality’s implementation and effects in Congo comple­
ments this scholarship. This book, however, departs from this body of work in 
stressing the importance of multi-level analysis. Whereas existing texts tend to 
look either at the global or the local dimensions of peace operations, I examine 
both and explore the relationship between them. As the analysis shows, this is 
important because the global politics of peacekeeping are not and cannot be 
separated from the local dimensions of peacekeeping. For example, as 
Chapter 3 details, the states which contribute the preponderance of peace­
keepers to Congo were among those most critical of assertive impartiality 
during institutionalization, most notably India and Pakistan. This had a 
profound effect on peacekeeping in Congo, as these actors resisted the new 
conception of the norm and advanced their own interpretations, which in turn 
heightened contestation at the field level and led to inconsistencies in practice.
The multi-level analysis of impartiality also contributes to scholarly debates 
about the role of norms in international relations—what they are, the effects 
they have, and how and where they should be studied. As Chapter 1 explains, 
I understand impartiality as a norm in the social constructivist sense of the 
word, as a 'prescription[] for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of 
obligation, a sense that [it] ought to be followed’.^ For constructivist scholars, 
the sense of ‘oughtness’ inherent in norms such as impartiality stems from
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their existence as ‘social facts’.^^ They are beliefs or ideas that have no 
independent material or physical reality, and exist only because they are 
held intersubjectively—shared, to a certain degree, by actors in a group or 
community. This collective aspect is what gives norms their force.
Until recently, constructivist theorizing has been largely dominated by 
linear accounts of ideational change involving dichotomous outcomes, binary 
oppositions whereby actors either accept and institutionalize/internalize a 
norm, or resist and reject it. In what has been described as a series of 
‘waves’, scholars considered norms as developed and transported by norm 
entrepreneurs and social networks to be institutionalized internationally 
through various forms of sociaUzation (first wave).^® They emphasized the 
role of socio-legal structures to explain variance in institutionalization at the 
regional and domestic level (second wave).^^ And they introduced the notion 
of localization: the adaptive processes of‘reinterpretation’ and ‘reconstitution’ 
through which international norms become congruent with pre-existing local 
normative orders during institutionalization (third wave).^° In other words, 
how international norms ‘stick’ if they have, or are made to have, local 
resonance. The importance accorded to institutionalization by these scholars 
is premised on their behef that it produces consensus, as actors clarify the 
meaning of a norm, what constitutes ‘violation’, and what procedures wiU be 
used to coordinate ‘disapproval’ and impose ‘sanctions’ for violations.^* 
A norm’s formal adoption, in other words, is considered the bellwether of 
behavioural change.
However, as others have argued, this focus on the structuring power of 
norms downplays their inherent dynamism and complexity, the role of power 
in changing fteir content and scope, and in determining when, how, and why 
certain norms matter more than others, and to what effect.^^ What follows a 
norm’s institutionalization—actual practice—is for the most part left un­
attended in orthodox considerations of norms.^® This assumes an improbably 
straight line between ideas and outcomes, and suggests a somewhat simplified 
view of human agency in which action is reduced to ‘something that ap­
proaches stimulus-response behaviour’.^ Moreover, it ignores the very real 
possibility of contestation either between two norms that do not fit together, 
or of conflicting interpretations of the same norm following its formal accept­
ance. It is precisely because norms like impartiality are not objective truths but 
rather intersubjectively held beliefs that they can continue to be contested and 
their meaning change even as they are formally adopted, shaped by practice, 
and by the broader social context in which they are situated.
To account for this dynamism and the inherent contestability of norms, 
I conceive of impartiality as a composite. The composite norm is a heuristic 
tool that captures the changing meaning of impartiality and provides analyt­
ical purchase for the study of contestation at both the macro- and micro-level. 
Rather than simply rejecting or accepting impartiahty, it reveals how actors
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may resist particular elements of a norm and/or advance their own interpret­
ations of these elements, shaped by both ideational and material consider­
ations, and how, during both institutionalization and implementation, certain 
interpretations or group interpretations may be privileged.^® These nuances 
matter precisely because they shape behaviour and social expectations of 
behaviour. As Martin Hollis reminds us: ‘norms are no less effective for 
being fluid and no less real for being negotiable’.^ Indeed, it is critical to the 
argument of this book that the contestability of norms like impartiality does 
not invalidate, or even necessarily weaken them. Rather, it brings them, vitally, 
into the real and present-day world.
By widening the analytical lens to examine implementation in the Congo 
case, this book also engages with an emerging area of research on normative 
practice. These scholars critique constructivism’s longstanding neglect of what 
happens after a norm like impartiality is institutionalized. Understanding the 
actual effects of international norms, they argue, requires the study of their 
implementation, or what one scholar describes as their ‘meaning-in-use’."*^ 
This body of work fully embraces the social essence of norms and highlights 
the practices, structures, and agents associated with norm interpretation and 
implementation, that, as the work rightly demonstrates, often result in norm 
contingency and contestation.*®
My approach complements this research, but, similar to the peacekeeping 
literature, it also demonstrates the importance of accounting for both institu­
tionalization and implementation as distinct, but often related, processes. To 
illuminate the mechanisms that incite contestation during implementation, 
scholars in this emerging area analytically bracket the disagreement over the 
meaning and/or appropriateness of norms that may have occurred during 
institutionahzation.*^ In doing so, they overlook the effects that institutional­
ization dynamics may have on the very practices they seek to understand.
This omission is problematic, inasmuch as it assumes that the practice of 
international norms can be understood without consideration of how they are 
debated, drafted, and institutionalized—processes that are frequently fraught 
with contestation and unresolved differences. As Chapter 2 describes, the 
UN’s formal adoption of a new conception of impartiality did not represent 
the moment of clarity suggested by many constructivist models. What is more, 
ambiguity at the macro-level over the norm’s relationship to sovereignty, the 
result of unresolved differences, became an issue in Congo when state officials 
were found to be complicit in widespread hmnan-rights abuses and the 
mission, in turn, was internally divided on how to respond in a manner 
consistent with impartiality. The implications of this for the present study 
are clear: if the meaning of impartiality was contested during its institution­
alization and if, as a result, it is vague and ambiguous, its implementation 
cannot be studied in isolation from the broader politics associated with its 
development and formal adoption.
Taking Sides in Peacekeeping
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METHODOLOGY
The theoretical approach 1 adopt to analyse impartiality has methodological 
implications. Given my emphasis on the contextual and contingent nature of 
norms, I pursue an interpretivist approach, which, as Mark Bevir explains, 
seeks to understand actions and events by taking into account ‘the intentions, 
concepts, and ideas constitutive of them’.®® In doing so, I employ a number of 
different methods.
Since this book proceeds from the argument that there has been a shift in 
the dominant understanding of impartiality as a norm of UN peacekeeping, a 
first, key task is to demonstrate that change. To do so, in Chapter 2 I construct 
a historical narrative of impartiahty using the composite norm.®^ Through 
textual analysis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, I examine 
the norm’s origins at the UN, trace the evolution of its components over six 
decades, and explicate the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the dominant 
understanding of impartiality that was institutionalized in the new millen­
nium.®^ This provides the basis for my subsequent analysis of macro-level 
politics surrounding institutionalization, as well as micro-level politics sur­
rounding implementation in the Congo case.
To illuminate political dynamics at both levels, the research is situated in 
what some have labelled the ethnographic turn in International Relations 
(IR).®® Like others in this emerging area of scholarship, I use ethnographic 
methods, including extensive fieldwork, participant observation, and semi- 
structured interviews at both the global and local level—an approach referred 
to as ‘multi-sited ethnography’. One of the advantages of this methodology is 
that it affords access to key institutional actors and local figures, as well as 
opportunities for sustained observation, both of which are necessary to study 
contestation directly. In the present study, this approach provided insight into 
critical decision-making processes surrounding peacekeeping in Congo and 
the effects of those processes on those responsible for and affected by the 
practices of UN peacekeeping. It also enabled an in-depth analysis of impar­
tiality at the macro-level, and by extension an account of the relationship 
between headquarters and the mission.
Fieldwork was carried out in several locations. Research on macro-level 
dynamics was done primarily in New York, with supplementary interviews 
in Washington, Ottawa, London, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, and Nairobi. 
Research for the case study and micro-level politics of peacekeeping was 
conducted during four periods of fieldwork in Congo between 2008-15. In 
Congo, I worked in a diversity of locales, from remote rural bases to field 
offices in the country’s eastern region, to the national headquarters of the 
mission in Kinshasa, the capital.®^ This allowed me to discern critical 
differences in how officials in these areas understood their role and inter­
preted their mandates.
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Multi-sited research produced multiple types of data and sources to 
illuminate contestation and the effects of the norm. A significant portion 
of data derives from the more than 300 semi-structured interviews 
I conducted with individuals involved in every aspect of peacekeeping: senior 
UN officials, diplomats, member state representatives, civil and military field 
officers, armed group members, civil society actors, and conflict-affected 
populations. In selecting my interviewees, I aimed to gain exposure to the 
broadest range of perspectives. I actively sought out individuals who con­
tested the dominant conception of the norm but who were largely excluded 
from decision-making during the processes of institutionalization and 
implementation. In New York, for example, I met with member states 
affiliated with the non-aligned movement (NAM), including representatives 
of the largest troop- and police-contributing countries. Findings from these 
interviews were supplemented by numerous discussions with political ana­
lysts and scholars who closely follow developments at the UN. The majority 
of these interviews were conducted under the condition of anonymity given 
political sensitivities surrounding the research and potential professional, 
reputational, and security ramifications.®^
Participant observation, which entails more intensive interaction between 
the observer and observed, complements the interview data. Observation 
conducted primarily for the case research was facilitated through attendance 
at daily internal UN meetings,®® field visits with UN staff, and by accompany­
ing peacekeeper patrol sweeps in rural areas.®^ These encounters shed light on 
the nature of the UN’s operations in Congo and assisted in understanding 
broader, ongoing political and security developments. This access also pro­
vided a particularly effective way of exploring the difference between formal 
policies and mandates, and actual practice. Lastly, I consulted a comprehen­
sive set of primary and secondary sources. These materials were used to cross 
check data obtained through interviews and participant observation, to ensure 
accuracy and to mitigate potential bias or selectivity of information.®®
Two final points of clarification on methods are necessary. The first con­
cerns the extent of my claims about the effects of impartiality. In evaluating 
the broader repercussions of the norm, I am not suggesting that impartiality 
‘causes’ particular action or outcomes in a constant or deterministic way, as is 
construed by positivist methodologies. Like other constructivists, I am inter­
ested in how norms may guide, inspire, rationalize, or justify behaviour; in 
other words, how understandings of impartiality and contestation over the 
norm enable and constrain particular actions or possible outcomes.®^ More­
over, my account of implementation notably draws particular attention to 
both the intended and unintended effects of norms. As discussed above, 
constructivists have tended to assume that, once adopted, a norm ‘does what 
it says on the tin’, i.e., induces actors either to undertake or avoid the 
behaviour it prescribes or enjoins. In contrast, my analysis shows how
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norms can also have unforeseen consequences as individuals respond stra­
tegically to the constraints and opportunities afforded by the international 
normative structure and by the expectations it engenders. In doing so, the 
book moves beyond the usual constructivist emphasis on how ‘good’ norms 
make the world better, showing that ostensibly well-intentioned norms can 
have harmful, even disastrous, consequences.®®
Lastly, in order to delve deeply into the material, the analysis was focused on 
a single-case study. While some social scientists highlight the limitations of the 
single-case study approach, namely, the lack of generalizability across cases 
and potential selection bias, these concerns apply to scholars seeking to 
develop falsifiable claims, and thus do not apply to the present study. Instead, 
the rigorous single-case research approach chosen here allowed me to go 
narrow and deep, and is necessary to explicate in sufficient detail the process 
of impartiality’s change, contestation, and effects across various levels of 
analysis. The Congo case, which stretched over fifteen years, serves the 
heuristic purpose of elucidating contextual contingencies during both institu­
tionalization and implementation, and the implications of assertive imparti­
ality in UN peacekeeping.®^ The length of the conflict also enabled me to look 
at the change over time within that context. In contrast to theory testing, the 
approach adopted is thus more akin to theory generation; it provides a strong 
empirical base, which allows for additional case research and conceptual 
refinements.®^ To include a second or third case would have required a 
sacrifice of depth for the sake of breadth. Given the paucity of conceptual 
analysis on impartiality as well as the intrinsic importance of the Congo case, 
objectives of generalizability are less applicable in this context. That said, as 
I discuss in the Conclusion, the analysis presented in this book opens the door 
to future research into how impartiality is being contested in other peacekeep­
ing cases and, more broadly, into the practices of those institutions associated 
with assertive liberal internationalism.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
Chapter 1 outlines the book’s conceptual framework. Both existing research 
on peacekeeping and popular discourse on UN operations are rife with 
conceptual confosion, exemplified by the frequent conflation of impartiality 
with neutrality. This confusion is not limited to scholarship on peacekeeping. 
Impartiality figures as a central concept in moral, political, and legal theory.®^ 
Yet, despite its ubiquity in the literature, impartiality is lamented by some 
critics as ‘almost universally misdescribed’,®^ ‘haphazardly analyzed’,®® and as 
having ‘stumbled its way into a series of holes, imponderables, and seeming 
contradictions.’®®
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Chapter 1 thus seeks in part to provide conceptual clarity regarding the 
norm of impartiality. It also situates this study within the constructivist 
approach. I introduce and develop the concept of a composite norm and 
elucidate the components of impartiality. This grounds the subsequent ana­
lysis of how understandings of impartiality in UN peacekeeping have changed 
and the ways in which the norm itself has been contested during the processes 
of institutionalization at the macro-level and implementation in the Congo 
case.
Using the composite norm, Chapter 2 traces the evolution of impartiality 
within the UN, explicates the reasons for and significance of the reconceptua­
lization of impartiality in the new millennium, and situates this change in the 
broader shift towards a more assertive liberal internationalism. As peace­
keepers and other international actors became more heavily engaged in 
intra-state conflict during the 1990s, in contexts where consent for their 
operations was tenuous, they confronted difficult questions about the sources 
of their own authority and how to adjudicate disputes between competing 
local claimants of authority. Assertive impartiality was an attempt to re-ground 
the authority of these actors in what was presented as a newfound unity 
of purpose: the culmination of the internationalization of human rights 
over several decades, and the supposed disassociation of rights from a particu­
lar political or partial agenda. Crucially, however, and contrary to what many 
constructivist theories would hold, impartiahty’s institutionalization has not 
resulted in conceptual clarity. The chapter concludes by considering the 
various ways in which the new dominant understanding of impartiality is in 
fact ambiguous and imprecise, rife with contradictions.
Through an analysis of political dynamics within the UN at the macro- 
organizational level. Chapters calls into question the purported consensus 
over the dominant conception of impartiality and the purposes of contem­
porary peacekeeping. It demonstrates how impartiality’s ambiguity is partly a 
reflection of contestation, and elucidates the procedural, substantive, and 
consequential objections of various actors. The chapter explains how, despite 
fierce contestation, the Security Council has continued to authorize robust 
mandates in accordance with the new conception of impartiality. It argues that 
the surmounting of this disjuncture is explained by the Council’s overarching 
ability to determine peacekeeping policy. But, crucially, the power of Council 
members is not unfettered; they too face constraints due to the very nature of 
assertive impartiality and to their prior rhetorical affirmation of the norm. 
These dynamics matter, precisely because they have an impact on peacekeep­
ing practice.
From here, my analysis turns to the process of implementation and the 
micro-level politics associated with peacekeeping in Congo. Chapter 4 begins 
with a brief historical overview of the conflict and the five phases of the UN 
mission (1999-2015). I examine each phase, and identify critical junctures
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where spoilers obstructed the peace or political process, and/or civilians faced 
imminent threats or were harmed: situations that, according to assertive 
impartiality, warrant the use of force. The chapter reveals how judgments as 
to who was perpetrator and who was victim, as well as to who was the 
protector and who the party in need of protection, were subjective, fluid and 
deeply contested, reflecting dynamics at both the global and local level. As a 
result of this contestation, implementation of the norm was inconsistent, with 
a host of unintended consequences.
Chapter 5 examines the effects of assertive impartiality on four specific sets 
of actors at the field level: civilians, armed groups, the state, and the UN 
mission itself. It shows how the robust role prescribed for peacekeepers 
raised expectations and created incentives for local actors in the Congo, 
engendering behaviour that would not have occurred otherwise. These 
effects damaged the mission and deepened local perceptions that the UN 
was partial. Despite these consequences, the Security Council’s response to 
policy failure in the Congo, time and time again, was to scale up the 
mission’s mandated ‘robustness’, which in turn only further tarnished its 
credibility and capacity to act as a broker of peace. The chapter argues that 
in the absence of consensus over a real strategy to resolve conflict in the 
Congo, without a willingness by member states to commit the necessary 
political capital and resources, assertive impartiality offered merely the 
illusion of constructive and active engagement. Ambitious mandates that 
aimed to save lives projected an image of consensus. They covered up deep 
political divisions at both the global and local level, while making scant 
progress to foster peace in Congo.
The Conclusion lays out the book’s implications for theory and policy. It 
summarizes the findings, discusses their relevance for other contemporary 
peace operations and offers a way forward. It argues that analysis of the 
inherent and perhaps irreconcilable tensions and moral quandaries associ­
ated with the new conception of impartiality is critical if we are to move 
beyond the usual litany of ‘lessons learned’ studies as well as the technical 
solutions to peacekeeping dilemmas so frequently tabled by practitioners 
and academics.
Understanding contemporary peacekeeping practice as well as other liberal 
internationalist advances requires an acute sensitivity to context, and an 
appreciation of how politics—international, institutional, and local—shapes 
practice. More fundamentally, the way in which even the most laudable of 
international norms may produce grievous unintended consequences requires 
both practitioners and academics to be more reflective about the norms they 
study, defend, and even espouse. Seen from such a multiplicity of perspectives, 
the loud circling of the UN’s helicopter gunships during Operation Djugu III 
represents a stage of evolution in international relations that this book argues 
is anything but impartial.
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